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Summary
“Identifying Cartels that Use the Illinois Brick Ruling as a Shield” looks at a landmark Supreme Court ruling,
known as the Illinois Brick (IB) decision, which bars “indirect purchasers” from bringing antitrust suits
against upstream product manufacturers. The research suggests the IB ruling not only reduced the costs
associated with antitrust enforcement but has the potential to enable firms upstream in the supply chain to
engage in collusion through the use of the wholesale price plus fixed fee structure (WPFF). WPFF allows
manufacturers to pay a fixed fee to retailers, compensating them for stocking fewer, higher cost items than they
would under perfect competition. The fee acts as a disincentive for retailers to level antitrust suits against
manufacturers. And consumers, whose welfare is reduced by the collusion, are forbidden from bringing
antitrust action by the IB ruling. The incentive to collude is greater when demand uncertainty for a product is
higher, the number of retailers in the market is higher, and the number of manufacturers is lower. Public
enforcers of antitrust law can use this knowledge to focus their monitoring efforts on firms embedded in the
type of supply chain structures described here while using WPFF contracts.
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Identifying Cartels that Use the 
Illinois Brick Ruling as a Shield
Nitish Jain, PhD; Sameer Hasija, PhD; and Serguei Netessine, PhD
In 2007, a civil suit was filed against a group of cathode ray tube (CRT) 
manufacturers—including Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., Philips Electronics NA, 
Panasonic Corp., LG Electronics Inc., and Toshiba Corp.—for fixing prices over 
the 12-year period from March 1, 1995 to November 25, 2007.1
After a tedious damage discovery process span-
ning several years, a group of plaintiffs (the so-called 
indirect purchaser plaintiffs) who had bought the 
overpriced CRTs through intermediaries reached 
settlements amounting to $576 million.2 Although the 
California Northern District Court finally approved 
the settlements in 2016, it limited the monetary com-
pensation to those states that had enacted “repealer” 
statutes in response to the U.S. Supreme Court judg-
ment in a landmark case: Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 
(431 U.S. 720, 1977). The CRT case was just one of 
thousands of legal cases—involving products as diverse 
as credit cards, pharmaceutical drugs, and airline 
flights—affected by this Supreme Court ruling.
The Illinois Brick (IB) decision bars an indirect 
purchaser (e.g., consumer) from suing and recover-
ing antitrust damages based on a “pass-on” claim 
charged by an upstream firm (e.g., manufacturer) that 
gets passed-on to them by an intermediary firm (e.g., 
retailer). The legal intuition behind the judgment is 
that indirect purchaser suits could transform “into 
massive multiparty litigations involving many distri-
bution levels and including large classes of ultimate 
SUMMARY
• The landmark Supreme Court ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 
(IB), which bars “indirect purchasers” from bringing antitrust suits 
against upstream product manufacturers, has greatly reduced the 
legal costs associated with antitrust enforcement.
• The ruling also might have another, lesser-known result: it has the 
potential to enable firms upstream in the supply chain to engage 
in collusion through the use of a particular contract structure—the 
wholesale price plus fixed fee structure (WPFF).
• The key component of the WPFF structure is a slotting fee, by which 
manufacturers agree to pay a fixed fee to retailers, compensating 
them for stocking fewer, higher cost items than they would under 
perfect competition. The fee acts as a disincentive for retailers to 
level antitrust suits against manufacturers. And consumers, whose 
welfare is reduced by the collusion, are forbidden from bringing 
antitrust action by the IB ruling.
• The research suggests that the incentive to collude is greater when 
demand uncertainty for a product is higher, the number of retailers 
in the market is higher, and the number of manufacturers is lower.
• Public enforcers of antitrust law can use this knowledge to focus 
their monitoring efforts on firms embedded in the type of supply 
chain structures described here while using WPFF contracts.
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consumers remote from the defen-
dant,”3 ultimately undermining the 
effectiveness of the suits, and resulting 
in an astronomical increase in admin-
istrative and legal costs. Hence the 
judgment prevents purchasers from 
suing unless they directly suffered the 
antitrust injury. Practically speaking, 
only retailers—and not consum-
ers—can file antitrust claims against 
product manufacturers.
Since its inception, the IB rul-
ing has attracted considerable debate 
among scholars and practitioners 
alike. Notably, the Department of 
Justice under President Trump has 
recently taken public positions both 
against and, later, in support of this 
law, signaling a desire to overturn and, 
shortly afterwards, uphold the prac-
tice at the federal level of prohibiting 
indirect purchaser suits.4 Over the last 
four decades, in fact, 26 U.S. states 
and Washington, D.C. have intro-
duced varying forms of IB “repeal-
ers.”5 The other 24 states continue to 
support the IB ruling, recognizing its 
role in limiting administrative bur-
dens (see Figure 1)—a role that is not 
insignificant. On average, the cost of 
administering a settlement fund (as a 
percentage of the settlement amount) 
associated with indirect purchaser 
suits is more than 75% higher (2.42 
percentage points) than the cost 
for direct purchaser suits (5.63% vs. 
3.21%).6
 Although the IB ruling reduced 
legal costs by precluding indirect 
purchaser suits, it has also enabled 
upstream firms to collude, simply 
through the use of pre-specified fixed 
payments to their intermediaries, as 
will be discussed below. These pay-
ments attenuate the incentives of 
their direct purchas ers to file antitrust 
suits.7 In other words, the ruling 
weakens the role of private enforc-
ers (i.e., firms, in their roles as direct 
purchasers) in curbing, via lawsuits, 
the anti-competitive behavior of other 
firms. As a result, public enforcers 
(i.e., government entities) must, via 
regulatory monitoring, step up their 
efforts. This raises a conundrum: how 
can the IB-related benefits of lower 
legal costs be retained without either 
significantly increasing public enforce-
ment costs8 or suffering the adverse 
consequences of anti-competitive 
behavior in the market?
1  J. S. Tigar (US District Court Judge), “Case No. C-07-5944 
JST, MDL No. 1917,” July 7, 2016, http://bit.ly/2C5OS0U 
(accessed 20 April 2018).
2  The settlements comprised agreements with Samsung for 
$225 million, Philips for $175 million, Panasonic for $70 
million, Toshiba for $30 million, Hitachi for $28 million, 
LG for $25 million, Chunghwa for $10 million, and a joint 
agreement with Thomson and TDA for $13.75 million.
3  Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 1977.
4  Mary Strimel and Emre Ilter, “Trump DOJ’s Next Target: 
the Illinois Brick Indirect Purchaser Rule?” The National 
Law Review, February 2, 2018. Also Grant Schnell, “Trump 
DOJ’s Antitrust Enforcement Policies Are Predictably 
Unpredictable,” JDSUPRA, May 21, 2018, https://www.
jdsupra.com/legalnews/trump-doj-s-antitrust-enforce-
ment-55848/. 
5  Michael A. Lindsay, “Overview of State RPM,” American Bar 
Association, April 2017 (accessed 20 April 2018). Among 
these 26 states, four authorize their respective attorneys 
general (as parens patriae) to secure monetary relief for 
indirect damages, two allow the state (or any of its political 
subdivisions) to bring an action for indirect damages, and 
one state allows its courts to make additional orders or 
judgments as may be necessary to recover indirect dam-
ages. 
6  J.P. Davis and J.H. Lande (2012), “Toward an Empirical and 
Theoretical Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement,” 
Seattle UL Rev., 36:1269, p. 1307, table 11.
7  M. Pieter Schinkel et al. (2008), “Illinois Walls: How Barring 
Indirect Purchaser Suits Facilitates Collusion,” The RAND 
Journal of Economics, 39(3): 683-698.
8  In a recent report to the U.S. Congress, the Office of Man-
agement and Budget estimated the administrative cost of 
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FIGURE 1: STATES AND THE ILLINOIS BRICK RULING IN 2019
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The solution to this conundrum 
may lie in improving the ability of 
public enforcers to identify the firms 
that are most likely to commit IB-
enabled antitrust violations. Since the 
IB ruling weakens the incentives of 
private enforcers to act, we examine 
whether supply chain interactions can 
be used to improve public enforce-
ment.9 We focus specifically on the 
procurement contracts between a 
manufacturer and its direct purchas-
ers. A choice of contractual agreement 
between two supply chain members 
not only determines the supply chain’s 
overall efficiency, but it is also instru-
mental in determining how the result-
ing profits are allocated.10 Market 
conditions may lead to a preferential 
ranking (by supply chain members) 
among contractual agreements that 
might otherwise seem to be equiva-
lent.11 
Motivated by these observations, 
we compare the extent to which 
five common contractual structures 
facilitate anti-competitive (collusive) 
decision-making among firms. If these 
contract types do differ on that score, 
then public enforcers can enact simple 
rules that will improve their ability to 
select appropriate cases for investiga-
tion of antitrust violations and thereby 
reinforce the IB framework. 
DIGGING INTO THE 
DIFFERENT CONTRACTS
We model a three-tier supply 
chain that consists of manufactur-
ers, retailers (direct purchasers), and 
consumers (indirect purchasers) in the 
context of the IB ruling. For each of 
five different contractual structures—
wholesale price, minimum order 
quantity, wholesale price plus fixed 
fee, revenue-sharing, and quantity 
discounts—we study the propensity of 
manufacturers to collude. We find that 
the five types of contracts are quite 
distinctive in their ability to facilitate 
collusion. Specifically, no collusion 
is feasible under the wholesale price, 
minimum order quantity, revenue-
sharing, and quantity discount 
contracts. Although manufacturers 
could earn more profit by colluding 
under these four contract types, those 
structures would reduce retailer profits 
in comparison with a competitive 
decision-making scenario. Retailers 
would take legal action against any 
collusive behavior by manufacturers 
under such contracts and, as a result, 
manufacturers would not be able to 
sustain a cartel. 
In contrast, the wholesale price 
plus fixed fee (WPFF) structure 
facilitates collusion via a side payment 
from manufacturers to retailers—
sometimes referred to as a slotting 
fee—and it enables manufacturers 
not only to form but also to sustain a 
cartel. In the presence of the IB rul-
ing, manufacturers are no longer indif-
ferent towards the five contractual 
structures: there is a clear preference 
for WPFF in light of the IB ruling. 
The feature that any WPFF con-
tract must have in order for collusion 
to be feasible is the use of slotting 
fees. Under a WPFF contract, manu-
facturers agree to pay a fixed fee to 
retailers (similar to the slotting fees 
observed in practice), compensat-
ing them for stocking fewer, higher 
cost items than they would under 
perfect competition. Slotting fees, in 
short, make retailers indifferent to 
manufacturer collusion because they 
make the retailers financially whole. 
(Absent the IB ruling, manufacturers 
set this fixed-fee term to zero.) Slot-
ting fees have been a fixture since the 
mid-1980s. Many reasons have been 
advanced to explain their prevalence: 
demand signaling and screening, cost 
and risk sharing, product assortment 
coordination, the exercise of market 
power by retailers, and as a tool for 
manufacturers to gain competitive 
foreclosure.12 But we highlight an 
additional factor that encourages a 
the country’s 129 major regulations to be between $74 
billion and $110 billion (in 2014 dollars) over the ten-year 
period from 2005 to 2014. See Competitive Enterprise 
Institute, Ten Thousand Commandments, Annual Survey, 
2017.
9  The principal source of this Issue Brief is Nitish Jain, Sa-
meer Hasija, and Serguei Netessine (2018), “Supply Chains 
and Antitrust Governance.”
10 Gerard Cachon (2003), “Supply Chain Coordination with 
Contracts,” Handbooks in Operations Research and Man-
agement Science, 11:227-339.
11 Gerard Cachon and A.G. K ̈ok (2010), “Competing Manu-
facturers in a Retail Supply Chain: On Contractual Form and 
Coordination,” Management Science, 56(3): 571-589.
12 For a comprehensive survey of academic and practitioner 
views on the practice of slotting fees, the reader is referred 
to Bloom et al. (2000), “Slotting Allowances and Fees: 
Schools of Thought and the Views of Practicing Managers,” 
Journal of Marketing, 64(2):92-108.
13 We used the A. C. Nielsen Homescan panel data set (Albu-
querque and Bronnenberg 2009, Hwang and Park 2015), 
which records both the food and non-food purchases of 
registered panelists. 
14 Cachon, supra note 8. See also P. Rasmussen, “What Are 
the Factors Driving MOQ?” East West, July 12, 2017, 
http://bit.ly/2J7t43R (accessed 20 April 2018).
NOTES 
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supply chain’s use of slotting fees, 
namely that firms may use them solely 
to enact collusive actions under the 
IB ruling. That said, manufacturers 
can cite the aforementioned reasons—
however misleadingly—to justify the 
collusion-enabling fixed payments 
made to retailers. 
Under collusion, manufacturers  
set a higher wholesale price than 
under competition. In terms of social 
welfare, we find that in the presence  
of the IB ruling, under the WPFF 
contract structure, both consumer 
surplus and total surplus are lower 
than under competition. In sum, we 
find that the IB ruling induces a pref-
erential ranking, from the standpoint 
of manufacturers, among contract 
structures to which they would be 
indifferent in the absence of that 
ruling. Public enforcers of antitrust 
regulations can exploit this finding 
to improve case selection by focusing 
on supply chains that employ WPFF 
contracts with slotting fees. 
USING MARKET DEMAND 
TO TARGET ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT
The WPFF contract structure 
facilitates manufacturer collu-
sion under all demand scenarios. In 
practice, however, manufacturers’ 
incentives to collude will depend 
on the monetary gain that can be 
achieved through collusion. A higher 
gain implies that, under collusion, 
manufacturers not only have a higher 
potential to increase their individual 
profits, but also have a greater flexibil-
ity in using fixed payments to mitigate 
retailers’ incentive towards filing an 
antitrust lawsuit. Thus, a better under-
standing of the factors that influence 
gains under collusion would enable 
antitrust public enforcers to effectively 
select product categories for monitor-
ing anti-competitive actions. 
To that end, we compiled data 
on all purchases made by a random 
sample of 10,000 customers over the 
five-year period 2004–2009.13 We 
found that the supply chain profit 
difference between the competition 
and collusion scenarios increases with 
respect to one variable in particular: 
demand uncertainty (i.e., the abil-
ity of a firm or industry to accurately 
predict consumer demand for its 
products or services). For high-
demand uncertainty products, the 
profit difference ranges from 13.8% 
to 23.5%, while the profit difference 
for medium-demand uncertainty 
products ranges from 13.6% to 17.5% 
and that for low-demand uncertainty 
products ranges from 12.1% to 12.3%. 
Since manufacturers are more likely 
to collude in product categories for 
which demand uncertainty is higher, 
it follows that public enforcers can 
make the most efficient use of their 
limited resources by prioritizing cases 
of product categories characterized by 
high demand uncertainty over catego-
ries within which product demand is 
more certain. Some examples of each 
category are in Table 1.
The incentive for manufacturers to 
collude also increases with the number 
of retailers. Robust retailer competi-
tion leads to lower prices, lower supply 
chain profit, and lower profits for 
individual retailers. But by colluding, 
manufacturers are effectively able to 
control retailers’ supply to the mar-
ket and, thus, drive the supply chain 
profits upwards. Hence the presence 
of a greater number of retailers makes 
it more likely that manufacturers will 
form a cartel using WPFF contracts. 
Finally, given the challenges involved 
in coordinating anticompetitive 
TABLE 1: DEMAND UNCERTAINTY—REPRESENTATIVE PRODUCTS
DEMAND UNCERTAINTY
PRODUCT-TYPE Low Medium High
Food and  
Beverages
Canning and 
Freezing Supplies, 
Ice, Fruit-Dried
Baby Food, Baked 
Goods-Frozen, 
Beer, Baking 
Mixes,Breakfast 
Food-Frozen, Eggs, 
Fresh Meat
Cereal, Butter and 
Margarine, Cheese, 
Carbonated Drinks, 
Fresh Produce, Ice 
Cream, Pet Food, 
Snacks, Yogurt
Non-Food
Automotive, 
Photographic 
Supplies, Cosmetics, 
Charcoal and Logs, 
Disposable Diapers, 
Electronics-Records-
Tapes, Men’s 
Toiletries
Batteries and 
Flashlights, Haircare, 
Oral Hygiene, 
Glassware, Hardware 
and Tools, Cold and 
Cough Remedies
Stationery and 
School Supplies, 
Paper Products
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behavior among larger numbers of 
firms, the incentive for manufacturers 
to collude decreases as the number of 
(and competition among) manufactur-
ers increases.
THE BIG TAKEAWAY FOR 
POLICYMAKERS
The Illinois Brick ruling encour-
ages anti-competitive actions among 
upstream firms. It can act as a legal 
shield for colluding firms if they can 
eliminate the threat of a lawsuit aris-
ing from their direct purchasers. 
We can now profile the most likely 
offenders, however. Public enforcers of 
antitrust law can focus their monitor-
ing efforts on firms embedded in sup-
ply chain structures that meet these 
criteria. Specifically, collusive manu-
facturer behavior, shielded by the IB 
ruling, is most likely to occur in cases 
where manufacturers use (1) wholesale 
price plus fixed fee contracts (sup-
ported by the use of slotting fees), in 
product categories marked by (2) high 
demand uncertainty, (3) high retailer 
competition, and (4) low manufac-
turer competition. This knowledge 
can lead to significant administra-
tive cost savings for public enforcers 
given that WPFF contracts are widely 
prevalent in practice.14  Targeted 
regulatory monitoring, furthermore, 
could provide support for the Illinois 
Brick framework—namely its legal 
and administrative cost reduction ben-
efits—going forward. 
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
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